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Optimizing Department of Homeland Security 
Defense Investments: 
Applying Defender-Attacker (-Defender) Optimization 
To Terror Risk Assessment and Mitigation1 
 
Gerald G. Brown, W. Matthew Carlyle, and R. Kevin Wood 
Operations Research Department 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93943 
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is investing billions of dollars to protect us from 
terrorist attacks and their expected damage (i.e., risk). We present prescriptive optimization models to 
guide these investments.  Our primary goal is to recommend investments in a set of available defense 
options; each of these options can reduce our vulnerability to terrorist attack, or enable future mitigation 
actions for particular types of attack.  Our models prescribe investments that minimize the maximum risk 
(i.e., expected damage) to which we are exposed. Our “Defend-Attack-Mitigate risk-minimization model” 
assumes that terrorist attackers will observe, and react to, any strategic defense investment on the scale 
required to protect our entire country.  We also develop a more general tri-level “Defender-Attacker-
Defender risk-minimization model” in which (a) the defender invests strategically in interdiction and/or 
mitigation options (for example, by inoculating health-care workers, or stockpiling a mix of emergency 
vaccines) (b) the attacker observes those investments and attacks as effectively as possible, and (c) the 
defender then optimally deploys the mitigation options that his investments have enabled.  We show with 
simple numerical examples some of the important insights offered by such analysis.  As a byproduct of 
our analysis we elicit the optimal attacker behavior that would follow our chosen defensive investment, 
and therefore we can focus intelligence collection on telltales of the most-likely and most-lethal attacks. 
 
                                                 
1 Appears as Appendix E of: National Research Council, 2008, “Department of Homeland Security Bioterrorist Risk 
Assessment: A Call for Change,” National Academies Press, Washington, DC. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since 9/11, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has marshaled significant resources 
to assess the risk to our populace from terrorist attacks of all kinds.  The work we report here is directly 
motivated by just one such risk assessment: pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 10 
(HSPD 10) [The White House, 2004], DHS has conducted an extensive bio-terrorism risk-assessment 
exercise, referred to here as the Bio-Terror Risk Assessment (BTRA) [DHS 2006].  BTRA estimates risks 
of many bio-terror attack possibilities, and classifies a list of particular bio-terror agents as most-, 
intermediate-, and least-threatening. 
The BTRA risk assessment depends upon subject-matter experts (SMEs) advising, with perfect 
knowledge, the probability that the “attacker” (terrorist or terrorist group), or “defender” (the federal 
government), will choose some particular option at each stage of an 18-stage probability risk assessment 
tree. 
We contend that representing intelligent adversarial decisions with static probabilities elicited from 
SMEs is an untenable paradigm:  Not only can experts make mistakes, but static probabilities make no 
sense when the attacker can observe and react, dynamically, to any earlier decisions made by the 
defender.   
We also hold that the business of DHS lies not just in assessing risks, but also in wisely guiding 
investments of our nation’s wealth to reduce these risks.  These are strategic decisions that must be made 
now, in a deliberative fashion. 
Here, we try to adopt the same problem context as BTRA to recoup its estimable investment in risk 
modeling.  But, we distinguish between (a) strategic investment decisions that DHS makes that are visible 
to terrorists, (b) the decision a terrorist makes to attempt an attack and, finally, (c) the after-attack 
mitigation efforts that prudent DHS investments will have enabled. 
Our work applies equally well to any category of threat that concerns DHS enough to warrant 
investments so significant they cannot be hidden from our taxpayers, and thus not from terrorists, either.  
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Such threats cover biological, nuclear, chemical, and conventional attacks on our infrastructure and 
citizens, as well as sealing our borders against illegal immigration, and a host of military topics.   
The modeling presented here has been motivated and validated by more than one hundred 
worldwide infrastructure vulnerability analyses conducted since 9/11 by the military-officer students and 
the faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School [Brown et al. 2005a, Brown et al. 2006a].  Some of these 
studies have been developed into complete decision-support systems:  
• Salmerón, et al. [2004] have received DHS and Department of Energy support to create the 
Vulnerability of Electric Grids Analyzer (VEGA), a highly detailed, optimization-based 
decision-support system.  VEGA can evaluate, on a laptop computer, the vulnerability and 
optimal defense of electrical generation and distribution systems in the U.S., where risk is 
measured as expected unserved demand for energy during any repair-and-recovery period. 
• We have developed a decision-support system to advise policy regarding the interdiction of a 
proliferator’s industrial project to produce a first batch of nuclear weapons [Brown et al. 2006b, 
2007]. 
• The U.S. Navy has developed a decision-support system to optimally pre-position sensor and 
defensive interceptor platforms to protect against a theater ballistic missile attack [Brown et al. 
2005b]. 
The message here is that, with experience, we have gained confidence that these new mathematical 
methods produce results that exhibit the right level of detail, solve the right decision problems, and 
convey useful advice and insight to policy makers.  Such capabilities have not been available before. 
 
THE MODEL, “MXM” 
BTRA uses a descriptive model.  Our focus is prescriptive, rather than descriptive: our models 
suggest prudent investment and mitigation plans for biodefense, and we strive to provide a realistic 
representation of the attack decisions made by an intelligent adversary. 
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As the defender, we seek to allocate a limited budget among biodefense investment options to form 
a defense strategy that minimizes the maximum risk to a terrorist attacker’s actions.  We might define risk 
as the expected number of fatalities, or as the expected 95-th percentile of fatalities, or as any other gauge 
that appeals.  Risk is a somewhat ambiguous term when used to discuss our bilateral view of conflict 
between intelligent adversaries, so we hereafter substitute “expected damage to the defender.”  We 
assume that an intelligent adversary will attempt to inflict maximum expected damage.  The following, 
simplified model minimizes a reasonable upper bound on expected damage; we discuss generalizations 
later.  
Indices 
d D∈  defense strategy, e.g., stockpile vaccines A and B, but not C 
a A∈   attack alternative, e.g., release infectious agent V  
m M∈  after-attack, mitigation activity, e.g., distribute vaccine A 
dm M∈  mitigation activities enabled by defense option d , e.g., distribute vaccine A, distribute 
vaccine B 
md D∈  defense strategies that enable mitigation activity m  
k K∈  resource types used by mitigation activities, e.g., aircraft for distributing vaccine, 
personnel for administering vaccine 
Data 
,d adamage  expected damage if defense strategy d and attack alternative a are chosen, given no 
mitigation 
, ,d a mmitigate  expected damage reduction of after-attack mitigation effort m, given investment strategy 
d and attack a ,  (assumes additive reduction and , , ,d a m d a
m
mitigation damage≤∑ ) 
,k dr  total mitigation resource of type k  available if defense strategy d  is chosen 
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, ,k d mq  consumption of mitigation resource k  provided by defense option d for mitigation 
activity m   
Decision Variables 
dw   1 if defense strategy d chosen, else 0 
ax   probability attacker chooses attack alternative a ( 0 1ax≤ ≤ ) 
,d my   fraction of defense strategy d effort devoted to mitigation activity type m 
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Description 
The order of appearance of the operators, min, followed by max, followed by min, in the objective 
function (D0) represents the sequential nature of the decisions we are modeling, from the outside to the 
inside. The coefficient ,d adamage  in the objective accounts for any interdiction effects that strategy d 
has on attack a, effects that are independent of any mitigation activities.  (For example, vaccinating 
emergency and health-care providers falls under the category of “interdiction”: after an attack, no follow-
up mitigation efforts apply to this vaccination.) The right-most minimization term, over ,d my , subtracts 
from expected damage if a mitigating effort has been enabled by the defense plan, and if some amount of 
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that mitigation is applied.  For simplicity of exposition, we assume that mitigation results are additive and 
restricted to sum to some value not exceeding total expected damage.  (See the definition of 
, ,d a mmitigate .)  Constraint (D1) simply limits the defender to choosing one defense strategy.  Constraint 
(A1) limits the attacker to choosing a mixed attack strategy, which of course admits a pure attack as well.   
Constraints (M1) are joint resource constraints on mitigation efforts; constraints (M2) stipulate that 
mitigation efforts are permitted only if the enabling defense strategy has been chosen.  Constraints (M1) 
subsume those of type (M2), but we keep these separate for later clarity.  The attack variables, xa, and the 
mitigation variables, yd,m, are continuous.  If the attacker variables are restricted to be integer (for 
instance, they might be binary variables indicating whether or not the terrorists decide to fully develop 
and deploy a particular pathogen in an attack), then the resulting analysis becomes significantly more 
complicated than that which we present here.  Although dealing with bioterrorist attacks might be most 
naturally modeled using integer attacker variables, our model with continuous attack (ya) variables will at 
least provide a conservative estimate of the defender’s objective; i.e., the attacker’s abilities to inflict 
damage are over-estimated by our model. 
Discussion of MXM 
Figure E 1 depicts a tree showing the sequential actions of the defender (selecting a defense 
strategy), the attacker (choosing attack alternatives), and the defender (mitigating damage with resources 
put in place by the defense strategy).  (We use the generic term “tree” to represent the sequence of 
defender and attacker decisions we model.  The “decision tree” of Raiffa [1968] pits a single decision 
maker against Mother Nature, while here we have two opponents trying to shape an outcome governed by 
Mother Nature.  The term “game tree” [Kuhn, 1953] is a more appropriate term for our bioterror 
situation.)  Each defense strategy has an immediate effect on the maximum damage of any attack, 
reflected in ,d adamage ; it can also enable the capability to reduce after-attack damage by as much as 
, ,d a mmitigate , if the chosen defense strategy permits a full allocation of mitigation resources to 
mitigation action m.  Given a fixed defense strategy, we assume the attacker will first observe this 
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strategy and then respond with a mixed strategy over the set of possible attacks.  As we have said, this 
might be a relaxation of the original optimization problem faced by the attacker, and therefore grants him 
more attack capability than he really has in this sequential decision-making.  In general we cannot tell 
how weak this relaxation is, but for specific cases (especially those with a moderate number of feasible 
attacker decisions) we can use enumeration to bound the effect of this relaxation on the optimal objective 
function value. 
   




















Figure E 1.  This tree depicts, left-to-right, a leading defense strategy choice dw , consisting of 
component defense investment options, and visible to an attacker, followed by attack alternative 
choice(s) ax  that (each) inflict expected damage ,d adamage .  Square nodes indicate defender 
decisions, and circle nodes indicate attacker decisions.  We only illustrate a mitigation subtree (yd,m 
decisions) for one (wd, xa) pair.  For a given defense strategy 1dw = , the optimization recommends a 
mixed attack strategy for the attacker and a mixed mitigation response ,d my from the defender.  The 
defense strategy establishes all mitigation resources that can be used after an attack.  That strategy is 
seen by the attacker when he develops his attack plan.  Enabled mitigation resources can reduce 
expected damage through , , ,d a m a d mmitigate x y− .  (Our conservative model does not allow the defender 
to observe the precise type of attack, however, so the mitigation response may not be optimal.) . 
A “mixed attack strategy” means that the optimal attacker decision includes multiple attacks and 
then we choose mitigation responses, and this results in some damage that can only be estimated, and 
some part of that estimation can involve an expectation. (For example, the damage could involve an 
expectation taken over a probability distribution for the time between when an attack is launched to when 
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it is discovered.)  Thus, integrating damage over one or more probability distributions yields an objective 
function that measures “expected damage.” 
Solving MXM 
Temporarily fixing ˆw w=  in MXM, we take the linear-programming dual (hereafter referred to simply 
as “the dual”) of the innermost minimizing linear program, using dual variables kα  for constraints (M1), 
and ,d mβ  for constraints (M2).  This converts the inner “max-min problem” into a “max-max problem,” 
which is a simple maximization: 




max , , ,
,









x ad a d k d k d d md a k
a
a




z damage w x r w
x
q mitigate x d D m M
k K









+ ≥ ∀ ∈ ∈
≥ ∀ ∈
≥ ∀ ∈ ∈
∑ ∑ ∑
∑
∑ ∑  
Now, leaving ˆw w=  as shown in MAX-ATTACKER-LP, we take the dual of this linear program, 
using dual variables ℜ  for constraint (A1) and ,d my  for constraints (DM1), and then release w to vary as 
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The optimal solution to MIN-ILP prescribes among other things a choice for the defense strategy, 
w*, to be implemented immediately by the defender, before an attack occurs.  Given optimal incumbent 
solution w*, we recover the attacker’s optimal strategy x* by solving MAX-ATTACKER-LP(w*). 
 
A Numerical Example of MXM 
We provide a small numerical example to illustrate the features of MXM. 
We introduce a number of defensive investment options, programs that can be composed in groups 




i03 5  
Table E 1. Defensive investment options and costs.  For example, option “i03” costs 5.  
Total budget, logical, and perhaps political considerations will limit the combinations of 
these options that can comprise admissible defense strategies. 
 
In our example, the defensive investment options are denoted “i01,” “i02,” and “i03.”  From this 
set, policy makers have determined 6 combinations that comprise the subset of admissible defense 
strategies whose implementation will depend on the available budget; see Table E 2.  Table E 3 displays 
expected damage resulting from each defense strategy and each attack alternative, i.e., the terms 
,d adamage . 
   









d05 x x  
Table E 2. Defensive investment options in each potential defense strategy.  
Strategy “d00” makes no investment at all.  Defense strategy “d05” includes investment 
options “i02” and “i03.”  Logical, political, or other considerations preclude some of the 
strategies, for example, {“i01,” “i03”}.  The total available budget, not yet specified, 
can also preclude certain strategies.  For instance, {“i02” and “i03”} cannot be selected 




















Figure E 2.  The purpose of DHS defensive investment options is to reduce expected 
damage before an attack occurs, and/or allow mitigation of expected damage after one 
occurs.  The generic relationship illustrated here conjectures little to no effect at low 
investment levels, followed by increased effectiveness, and eventually leveling off with 
diminishing returns.  The triangles represent points we might use as alternate investment 
options to adequately represent the entire function. 
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Figure E 2 illustrates the generic relationship relating investment options to the ability to reduce 
expected damage from any terrorist attack before it is carried out, and/or mitigate damage after an attack 
occurs.  This is a complicated function, neither convex nor concave, but our sampling of representative 
points can be used to represent this in characterizing component investment options in defense strategies. 
Damage estimates in Table E 3 include any synergies among or interference between component 
investment options in each defense strategy preparing for each attack.  This is key.  BTRA makes a point 
of such dependencies, and we represent these in complete, realistic detail here. 
a01 a02 a03
d00 10 10 10
d01 10 5 7
d02 6 8 7
d03 6 6 6
d04 4 3 5
d05 5 5 4  
Table E 3. Expected damage resulting from each defense strategy 
(row) and each attack alternative (column), accounting for 
interdiction but not mitigation.  (This table gives the values for 
,d adamage  for MXM.  We use integral data to permit reproduction of 
our results.) 
Table E 4 represents estimated mitigation capabilities. These mitigation estimates correspond to a 
single, “full-strength” mitigation effort being applied to a single attack alternative.  If the attacker chooses 
a mixed attack strategy, we may need to spread mitigation effort across multiple activities, reducing the 
expected effectiveness of each activity accordingly. 
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m=m1 a01 a02 a03 m=m2 a01 a02 a03
d00 0 0 0 d00 0 0 0
d01 1 0 0 d01 1 0 0
d02 0 1 1 d02 0 2 0
d03 0 0 1 d03 0 0 1
d04 1 1 1 d04 0 1 2
d05 0 1 1 d05 0 0 2  
Table E 4.  Maximum expected damage reduction from a mitigation activity enabled (prior to an 
attack) by a defense strategy (and applied after an attack).  These tables specify  , ,d a mmitigate  for 
MXM, for each of two mitigation options (“m01” and “m02”), for each combination of defense and 
attack.  For example, with defense option “d04” and attack “a03,” if we choose mitigation “m01” we 
reduce the damage by one unit, but if we choose mitigation “m02” we reduce the expected damage by 
two units (circled values). 
 
The choice of defense strategy is limited by a total budget, which we vary over the integers from 0 
to 11.  We allow full employment of either mitigation effort, or any convex combination of them. 
Because the defender is minimizing the optimal objective function value of a maximization 
problem, the optimal solution invests to reduce the expected damage, given future mitigation capability, 
of the most-threatening mixed attack.  This requires that the defender invest in a defense strategy that 
enables him to mitigate several very-damaging attacks, and not just the worst one. 
Figure E 3 shows minimized maximum expected damage as a function of total defense budget, and 
Table E 5 summarizes the solutions for each budget break-point.  For instance, with a budget of 3, the 
optimal defense plan in MXM is to choose defense option “d02.”  The terrorists’ optimal attack is a 
mixed strategy, with a probability of 0.50 of choosing “a02” and probability 0.50 of choosing “a03”.  The 
resulting expected damage, after mitigation, is 6.5.  Analysis of this simple case reveals that we have 
optimally allocated our mitigation effort among the two worst attacks, reducing the expected damage in 
each attack to the same value, 6.5.  We can do no better than this, given our conservative approximation. 
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Figure E 3. Expected damage as a function of defense budget.  This display is for policy makers:  as 
we devote more and more defense budget, we achieve less and less expected damage.  Because the 
defender’s investment options here are discrete, each improvement appears as a staircase drop as soon as 
sufficient budget permits some new, improved cohort of investment defense options, i.e., a new defense 
strategy.  The law of diminishing returns is evident: expected damage reduced by each budget dollar 
decreases as budget increases.  Policy-makers can usually put their finger on the spot that appeals in an 
illustration such as this, perhaps based on criteria not part of the underlying modeling.  The uppermost, 
solid line displays the expected damage when all mitigationd,a,m values are set to zero (i.e., we have no 
mitigation capability) and only consider the expected damage from adopting a defense strategy, and then 
suffer the worst-case attack per expected damage in Table E 3.  The dashed line illustrates the expected 
damage from MXM, the tri-level optimization. 
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Budget w x z * w x y z *
0 d00 a01 10 d00 a01 - 10
2 d01 a01 10 d01 a01 m01 9
3 d02 a02 8 d02 a02(.50) m01(.50) 6.5
a03(.50) m02(.50)
5 d04 a03 5 d04 a01(.50) m01(.50) 3.5
a03(.50) m02(.50)
MXM with y = 0 MXM
 
Table E 5. For each budget just sufficient to afford a new defense strategy, we show the Defender-
Attacker solution and expected damage (i.e., for MXM with =y 0 ), the Defender-Attacker-
Defender solution (for MXM) and expected damage.  For example, with a budget of 3, the optimal 
defense strategy in MXM is “d02”.  The terrorists’ optimal attack is a mixed strategy, choosing alternative 
“a02” with probability 0.50, and “a03” with probability 0.50.  We anticipate responding accordingly with 
“m01,” the optimal response to “a01,” with the same probability (0.50), and similarly with “m02” with 
probability 0.5.  The resulting expected damage, after optimal mitigation in each case, is 6.5. 
 
Generalizing Beyond Tri-level Decision Problems 
The DHS biological threat risk assessment (BTRA) consists of an 18-stage probability risk 
assessment tree, where each decision has been replaced by an a priori probability; for example, see NRC 
[2007].  In the case of the each opponent, these probabilities are determined by subject-matter experts 
assessing how terrorists might make each decision, and how well DHS will do thwarting a bioagent attack 
at some intermediate stage of its development. 
We could instead model BTRA as a 19-stage defender-attacker-defender model, with a new stage 
zero describing how DHS can invest in strategic biological defense strategies, and each of the 
intermediate stages represented by a set of decision variables that prescribe attacker or defender behavior, 
and solve a multi-stage defender-attacker-defender(-attacker-...) model to determine optimal stage-zero 
investment decisions to minimize expected damage assuming each opponent makes the optimal decision 
at each node of the corresponding tree.  To fully represent the sequential nature of these decisions, we 
would require all decisions (except maybe those in the final stage) to be modeled with integer variables.  
However, solving such a model for just two stages of integer decisions is difficult.   
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We do not have the technology to handle three, much less 18, stages of alternating integer 
decisions.  Allowing continuous decision variables in each of the stages except stage zero (our defense 
decision variables) would again be a relaxation of the restrictions on the attacker, and could, in some 
cases, yield extremely weak bounds on our defensive capability.   
We now show in the case of a two-stage model how this relaxation from integer to continuous 
variables reduces the sequential decision problem to a simultaneous two-person zero-sum game. 
Consider the bi-level attacker-defender, max-min optimization formulation: (ALDL), where the 
subscript “L” denotes a linear program (i.e., continuous decision variables, and objective and constraints 
that are linear in those decision variables): 
 
[ ]
[ ] ( )
[ ] ( )



















  (ALDL) 
(ALDL) is a more general version of the model used by Fulkerson and Harding [1977] and Golden [1978] 
for their work on continuous network interdiction models. 
 Take the dual of the inner (defender, “y”) problem in (ALDL): 
[ ] ( )























  ( )L LA D  
This is our standard way to convert a “max-min” problem, for which there is no conventional 
optimization method, into an equivalent “max-max” problem that is nothing more than a conventional 
linear program. 
Now, reverse the order of play in (ALDL) to (DLAL): 
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  (DLAL) 
This variation on (ALDL) is formulated as if the defender makes his decision first. 
Take the dual of the inner, attacker, (“x”) problem in (DLAL):  
[ ] ( )























  ( )L LD A  
This formulation is equivalent to (DLAL), and is also a linear program. 
We observe that ( )L LA D  and ( )L LD A  are linear programming duals of each other, and thus 
(assuming both are feasible) have the same optimal objective-function values, which is the same as the 
optimal objective value of (ALDL).  Therefore, the sequence in which the decisions are made (either 
attacker first, followed by defender, or defender first, followed by attacker) has no impact on the optimal 
objective-function value. 
We have therefore proved the following: 
Theorem 1: for any attacker-defender model in the form (ALDL), we can exchange the 
order of decisions without affecting the optimal objective function value. 
Theorem 1 is a simple extension of von Neumann's [1928] minimax theorem for polyhedral feasible 
regions using a proof technique similar to Ville [1938], but using the more modern technology of LP 
duals directly.  This exchange argument, along with the observation that any two consecutive decision 
stages controlled by the same decision maker are equivalent to a single stage, (since both stages are either 
a maximization or both are a minimization over a set of decision variables, this is equivalent to a single 
maximization, or minimization, over all of those variables simultaneously), can be repeated for any 
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number of consecutive stages with continuous decision variables.  The final model obtained in this 
manner is a simple maximization or minimization problem.   
Specifically, if we were to apply this to the 18-stage BTRA model, (i.e., the model we would solve 
for any fixed, known defense decision in stage zero) we would aggregate adjacent attacker stages (and 
adjacent defender stages, if there are any) and reduce the 18-stage BTRA tree to eight stages.  We would 
then require that all decision variables be continuous, and then swap adjacent defender-attacker pairs of 
stages until we obtain a model having all of the attacker decisions in stage one and all of the defender 
decisions in stage two.  This resulting model is equivalent to model (ALDL), above, and hence is 
equivalent to a simultaneous game. 
The optimal solution would prescribe mixed strategies for the attacker and defender, eliminating the 
sequential nature of the real decisions that must be made.  In general the results from such an analysis 
might not be very accurate, as every relaxation of a block of integer variables to continuous and the 
subsequent interchange and aggregation of adjacent stages can result in a significant relaxation of attacker 
restrictions; in some models these approximations could get significantly less informative with each 
additional stage exchanged in this manner.   
However, if the sequencing of two adjacent attacker-defender stages is not a critical component of 
the formulation then the optimal solution of the relaxation might not be far off from that of the original 
model.  As a simple example, if the attacker chooses which pathogen to load into a truck, and the 
defender then chooses whether or not to emplace transportation blockades, relaxing the decision variables 
and exchanging these two stages might not be as significant a relaxation as in a situation where the 
attacker decides whether or not to release a pathogen, and the defender then chooses whether or not to 
employ his stockpile of a certain vaccine that can treat the attacker’s pathogen.  In the former case the 
blockades will work against the truck regardless of the pathogen chosen, while in the second example 
committing to use the vaccine before a pathogen is released is clearly a bad idea, and allows the attacker 
to cause significantly more damage. 
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How to Generalize BTRA to a Decision Model Prescribing Defense Investments 
If we are to leverage the considerable effort that went into the development of BTRA, we must use 
the data obtained, and elicit subject-matter-expert input, to develop a two- or three-stage sequential 
decision model of defensive investments, attacks, and mitigation responses such that the relaxation 
obtained by allowing continuous attacker variables, as in MXM, is at least a reasonable approximation. 
If we are successful in our new modeling effort, then the decisions at each stage except our new 
stage-zero will be continuous (and, more specifically, interpreted as mixed strategies), but now the values 
of these mixed-strategy probabilities will be prescribed by the optimization model: for the stage under 
control of the terrorists, these will represent the worst-case mix of attack decisions the terrorists can 
devise; in the mitigation stage, under DHS control, these will represent the best response to each of the 
attacker’s possible decisions in the previous stages. 
It is not lost on us that some of the BTRA probabilistic risk assessment tree’s probabilities exhibit 
dependence on the outcomes of some prior stages in the tree.  A reformulation to a two- or three-stage 
sequential decision model would necessarily require some reworking of this data.  For brute-force 
permutation of (potentially aggregated) stages, we could unwind the conditional probabilities with Bayes 
Theorem (just as DHS already does when they split the single BTRA tree into 28 independent trees, one 
for each bioagent, where selection of bioagent is the third terrorist stage in the original tree). 
However, we hope to move away from subject-matter-expert elicitations of highly dependent 
probabilities as follows.  These dependencies are presumably due to the influence of prior stages on the 
state of the terrorist (or DHS) in terms of exhaustion of limited resources.  MXM would explicitly guide 
strategic defensive investment in stage zero, and subsequently offer all the explicit resource-limiting 
features of a linear program for all the attacker decisions, and in parallel all the defender’s mitigation 
decisions that consume the mitigation resources provided by stage zero.  Linear programming has long 
been widely applied to planning industrial and military operations that precisely mimic a bioterror-agent 
production program, or a defense plan. 
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We recommend eliciting from SMEs an explicit assessment of the resources and capabilities of 
each opponent, and the way and rate at which various alternate activities would consume these.  This is, 
in fact, the way BTRA reports that the SMEs explained their reasoning to support probability 
assessments.  We advise using these technological estimates as explicit inputs, and letting MXM 
determine attacker mixed-strategy probabilities and expected consequences as outputs.  This would be 
much more transparent modeling, provide better documentation, and be less likely to be influenced by 
poor SME guesses about high-dimensional decisions governed by complicated resource limitations.  This 
also avoids the current step where SMEs convert capabilities assessments into just a few discrete, 
qualitative probability classes (e.g., “not likely”=0.2, “likely”=0.5, “very likely”=0.8). 
The initial linear integer program, and subsequent pair of linear programs afford us a great deal of 
flexibility and fidelity in describing the actions of each opponent, and we can solve these at very large 
scale with off-the-shelf optimization software.  Also, solutions to such optimization models can be 
analyzed to discover the “why” as well as the “what” of each plan.  Powerful, effective sensitivity and 
parametric analysis techniques are well-known for these optimization models. 
We represent defensive investment strategy selection simply, as we think realistic and politically 
palatable during this early phase of homeland security capital planning.  We anticipate that this will 
eventually mature to more closely resemble classic military capital planning [e.g., Brown, et al. 2004]. 
We present a deterministic model that minimizes the maximum expected risk.  If stochastic 
evaluation proves essential, our model can be used within a simulation.  Banks and Anderson [2006] 
demonstrate such exogenous simulation with a two person, zero-sum game.  Tintner [1960] shows this for 
a linear program.  Our integer linear program is amenable to such simulation. 
 
Secrecy in Planning 
If, as the defender, we strongly believe that we are able to conceal some of our defensive capability 
from the attacker, then the transparency of model MXM is likely to be inappropriate for determining 
optimal defense decisions.  Instead, we find ourselves in an asymmetric conflict: the attacker and the 
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defender do not agree on the objective function.  This more general case falls in the domain of bilevel and 
multi-level programming (see, for example, Candler and Townsley [1982], Bard and Moore [1992], and 
Migdalas et al. [1998]), and the associated mathematical models are more difficult to solve than those we 
have presented here. 
In an extreme case, for example, we might believe that even though the attacker can observe our 
strategic defensive investments, he is completely unaware of our mitigation capabilities.  We could then 
assume that he will make his decisions based only upon the damaged,a values, whereas, given that we are 
perfectly aware of our mitigation capabilities, we will make our investment decisions based on 
damaged,a−mitigated,a,m values.  This would be formulated as a tri-level integer programming model, the 
most general versions of which are difficult to solve.  However, a straightforward heuristic for solving our 
problem would solve an attacker-defender version of the problem with no mitigation options (i.e., by 
fixing yd,m=0), and then choose the optimal mitigation decision for whatever defense and attack decisions 
are made. 
Clearly this can lead to a suboptimal defense investment, especially when there are defense options 
that do not directly reduce expected damage (i.e., damaged,a might be high for those defenses) but that 
enable mitigation efforts that are significantly more effective than those available under other defensive 
investments.  We can use the stockpiling of a vaccine as an example; creating the stockpile will not 
reduce the damage of any attack, but the mitigation activity of distributing the vaccine and inoculating the 
susceptible population can be extremely effective.  In this case, the optimal defense and the resulting 
worst-case attack damage can differ significantly from the myopic defense.  There are other, more 
effective heuristics for multilevel optimization in the literature, the breadth of which is beyond the scope 
of this paper. 
In the case where the “secret” objective values maintain the same relative ranking between each 
pair of feasible defense and attack combinations as discloseded by the “public” objective function, then 
the optimal defense and resulting worst-case attack do not change.  For example, if the mitigation effects 
mitigated,a,m are always a fixed percentage of damaged,a, then the optimal defensive investments, and the 
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corresponding worst-case attack, will be the same, and the overall expected damage will be reduced by 
that fixed percentage.  In this case, (and similar cases, in which the mitigation efforts do not produce 
drastically different results from each other relative to the defense-and-attack combination they are 
applied to), it makes no sense to take extreme measures to conceal our mitigation capability.  In fact, we 
should broadcast it widely, in hopes that it will deter attacker efforts. 
However, in the case where our mitigation capabilities are much more (or less) effective for one (or 
a small number of) attacks than for the rest, and this fact fundamentally changes the worst-case attack 
decision for each of our defense options, then we conjecture that we should conceal this capability to 
maintain our advantage (or conceal our weakness) for that attack, and hopefully “shape” the attacker’s 
decisions towards the attacks that we are more capable of handling.  However, every situation is different, 
and it is extremely hard to predict what the effect any given “secrecy policy” will have on the optimal 
outcome, much less on the actual attacker behavior.  More research in this area is required. 
 
Solving MXM At Very Large Scale with Decomposition 
Although we have solved large attacker-defender models of the same form as MXM, [Brown et al., 
2005b], if instances of MXM become too large to solve using commercial off-the-shelf integer linear 
programming software, we can use (and have used) a version of Benders decomposition [e.g., Bazaraa, 
Jarvis, and Sherali, 1990, pp.366-367] to solve MIN-ILP, with integer stage-zero investment decisions 
and continuous mitigation decisions in the master problem, and the resulting attacker LP subproblems.  
Israeli and Wood [2002] explicitly develop such a decomposition for the case of shortest-path network 
interdiction problems. 
We modify MIN-ILP, replacing equations (DILP1) with a set of constraints (DILP-CUTS), and 
calling the resulting model MIN-ILP-DECOMP ˆ({ )xN } , where ˆ{xN }  represents the set of all attacker 
plans from completed decomposition iterations: ˆ ˆ} { , 1,..., }N nx x n N≡ ={ . 
, , , ,
, , ,
ˆ ˆ 1,..., (DILP-CUTS)n na ad a d d a m d m
d a d a m
damage w x mitigate x y n Nℜ ≥ − =∑ ∑ . 
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The complete decomposition algorithm is as follows: 
Algorithm DHS-MXM-DECOMP 
Input: Data for bio-terror defense problem, optimality tolerance 0ε ≥ ; 
Output: ε-optimal (MXM) defender plan ( *, *)w y ; 
1) Initialize best upper bound UBz ←∞ , best lower bound 0LBz ← , define the 
incumbent, null (MXM) defender plan * 11ˆ( "d00", * 0)w w y y← ≡ ← ←  as the best 
found so far, and set iteration counter N ← 1; 
2) Subproblem: Using ˆ ˆ Nw w= , solve the linear program subproblem MAX-
ATTACKER-LP ˆ( )w  to determine the optimal attack plan ˆ Nx ; the bound on the 
associated total expected target damage is max ˆ( )
Nz x ; 
3) If ( max ˆ( )
N
UBz z x>  ) set max ˆ( )NUBz z x←  and record improved incumbent MXM 
defender plan * * ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )N Nw y w y← ; 
4) If ( UB LBz z ε− ≤ ) go to End; 
5) Given attack plans ˆ }xN{ , attempt to solve master problem  
MIN-ILP-DECOMP( ˆ }Nx{ ) to determine an optimal defender plan 1 1ˆ ˆ( , )N Nw y+ + .  
The bound on the total expected target damage is min ˆ ˆ( , )z w y ; 
6) If  min ˆ ˆ( , )LBz z w y<  set min ˆ ˆ( , )LBz z w y← ; 
7) If  ( UB LBz z ε− ≤ ) go to End; 
8) Set N ← N +1 and go to step (2) (Subproblem); 
9) End:  Print “ * *( , )w y  is an ε-optimal (MXM) defender solution,” and halt. 
The optimal attacker plan *x  can be recovered by solving MAX-ATTACKER-LP ( )w* . 
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Each instance of MAX-ATTACKER-LP ˆ( )w  is a linear program of a form we expect to be easy to 
solve even at large scale. 
MIN-ILP-DECOMP( ˆ }Nx{ ) is easy to solve, but might get more challenging if embellished with 
too many more linear constraints.  For a difficult instance, or at very large scale, we can solve MIN-ILP-
DECOMP( ˆ }Nx{ ) with an approximate, but very fast heuristic, and our decomposition is still valid. 
The iterative behavior of the decomposition is instructive.  Set a defense plan, and observe the 
attack response.  Set another defense plan that is robust with respect to the attack response observed, and 
then observe another attack response.  As such iterations continue, the defender learns more about the 
attacker, and refines his defense plan accordingly.  Ultimately, the defender learns enough to declare that 
his best defense plan is (ε -) optimal against the best possible attacker plan, and attains a mathematical 
certificate of the quality of his defense preparations.  (See Table E 6.) 
   

























1 “d00” 0 “a03” 10 “m01” 
2 “d05” 2 “a01”  5 “m02” 




Table E 6:  Decomposition iterations reveal learning by opponents.  Here, the defender 
starts with defense strategy “d00” (do nothing), the attacker responds with his most-
damaging alternative “a03” inflicting damage 10.  Subsequent iterations adjust defense 
strategy based on elicited attacker behavior, until neither opponent can take another turn for 
any further improvement.  Our subject-matter experts (SMEs) are now optimization models.  
The last iteration yields the same optimal solution as shown in Table E 5.  Instead of using a 
“do-nothing” solution to initialize the algorithm, we can just as easily take any feasible 
incumbent proposed by any decision maker as our first attempt: the algorithm will evaluate 
this solution, and then either obtain a certificate of its optimality, or find a better incumbent.  
This is the distinguishing advantage of viewing these decomposition algorithms as 
“learning” methods that iteratively improve upon an incumbent, possibly suboptimal, 
solution. 
 
The decomposition mathematically represents two opposed sets of subject-matter experts:  a Blue 
Team (defender), and Red Team (attacker).  The decomposition iterations mathematically mimic a 
wargame between these opponents, where the defender suffers the disadvantage of not being able to hide 
his defense strategy, but the players play the game again and again, honing their respective strategies, 
until neither opponent can improve. 
At ultra-large scale, we can nest decompositions.  We do not anticipate this will be necessary for 
this application. 
We have implemented MXM and our decomposition algorithm for solving it in GAMS [2007].  All 
model instances have been solved optimally.  The complete implementation is available from the authors. 
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How do we get here from a descriptive risk assessment (e.g., DHS BTRA)? 
First, we must recognize and accept that each event-tree path in BTRA consists almost exclusively 
of a set of decisions—these are not random events.  There are 18 successive “events” in the NRC 
rendition of BTRA [NRC 2007, Table E 3-4].  From start to finish, we show each event number, using 
parentheses to distinguish defender actions, and brackets for Mother Nature at the end:  the BTRA event 
sequence is 1-5, (6), 7-11, (12), 13, (14-15), 16, (17), [18].  The first attacker event sequence addresses 
selection of agent, target method of dissemination, and acquisition, the next attacker sequence involves 
details of agent production and processing, the following attacker sequence describes transport and 
storage, and the last estimates repeated attacks.  These attacker sequences are interrupted by opportunities 
for the defender to interdict.  The last stage [18] represents Mother Nature influencing consequences.  For 
our purposes, there are merely four alternations from attacker to defender, followed by one truly random 
event governed by Mother Nature at the end. 
Second, we decide how to reckon ,d adamage  as a function of defense strategy d and attack 
alternative a.  This is not a glib statement, but rather a meta-design guide to return to the foundations of 
BTRA and critically review the assumptions of sequence-dependence and level of detail. 
In theory, this could be achieved by setting a defender option d, and estimating the consequences of 
this action on BTRA for each pure attacker response.  This is no harder than for BTRA, and if we 
concentrate on estimating ,d adamage  as a function of defense option d and a more palatable (i.e., unlike 
BTRA, a less minutely-detailed and less overwhelmingly numerous) set of attack alternatives a, we would 
create a risk-calculation engine that is at once credible, and efficient. 
By whatever means, we must estimate ,d adamage  for each defense option d and each attack 
alternative a.  If we cannot estimate risks at this fidelity, we have no business doing risk analysis. 
We would prefer to be able to choose a number of defense strategies, rather than just one.  But, 
current risk analysis produces a single damage estimate distribution for each attack scenario.  We assume 
these damage estimates are neither additive nor separable between and among attacks, so we must rely on 
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the simplified risk analysis we have.  Accordingly, we endow each defense strategy with the number of 
defense investment options reflected in each BTRA path. 
Our attack alternatives have not specified any particular agent.  Our methods can accommodate 
attacks by classes of agents that include engineered and future agents not yet known. 
Solving the tri-level model achieved here isolates an optimal defense strategy, and all its component 
investment options.  Because this optimal strategy dominates every attack by any agent, we have 
presented an intrinsic risk analysis that highlights the most-critical, achievable defense strategy.  We can 
trivially rule out this best strategy, and solve for the second-best, and so forth.  This renders an explicit, 
unambiguous prioritization of defense strategies 
 
Mere probabilistic risk assessment is not enough 
What we are proposing here responds directly to the explicit language of HSPD 10: 
“the United States requires a continuous, formal process for conducting routine 
capabilities assessments to guide prioritization of our on-going investments in 
biodefense-related research, development, planning, and preparedness.” 
 
Further, we could not agree more with this: 
“Successful implementation of our program requires optimizing critical cross-cutting 
functions” 
 
Recently, HSPD 18 [The White House, 2007] has further clarified our direction: 
“optimize the investments necessary for medical countermeasures development, and 
ensure that our activities significantly enhance our domestic and international response 
and recovery capabilities” 
 
Further: 
“Mitigating illness and preventing death are the principal goals of our medical 
countermeasure efforts.” 
 
Moving beyond mere descriptive risk analysis, we want to address: 
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“(a)  Target threats that have potential for catastrophic impact on our public health and 
are subject to medical mitigation; 
(b)  Yield a rapidly deployable and flexible capability to address both existing and 
evolving threats; 
(c)  Are part of an integrated weapons of mass destruction consequence management 
approach informed by current risk assessments of threats, vulnerabilities, and capabilities; 
and 
(d)  Include the development of effective, feasible, and pragmatic concepts of operation 
for responding to and  recovering from an attack.” 
 
We can see from these policy directives that the highest-level DHS problem is planning 
investments—huge investments—to prepare to mitigate the consequences of any attack. 
The material presented here follows both the letter and the spirit of this direction. 
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